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Abstract
Does Europeanization matter, and, if so, to what extent and in what respects? While research on the 
European Union is thriving, only limited efforts have been directed towards a discussion of this 
crucial question. This paper examines the outcome of the EU policy process from various 
comparative perspectives in an effort to distinguish the 'net effects' of EU membership and EU-
level policy outcomes from more general – perhaps global – processes of change. The effects of 
EU membership are discussed in relation to the process of liberalization and the major question 
raised is whether Europeanization matters for the advance of liberalization. In responding to this 
question, the paper advances the following major argument: While the Europeanization of the 
telecoms and electricity industries has led to some liberalization, it is at best a mediating variable, 
not an independent one. The major features of liberalization would have been diffused to 
practically all member states even in the absence of the European Commission and other agents of 
supranationalism. This is not to suggest that Europeanization does not matter, but that it matters in 
less obvious and perhaps less critical ways than is frequently assumed. These arguments are 
supported by comparative empirical analysis of the spatial and temporal diffusion of liberalization 
across nations and sectors, and by a comparison of the diffusion of liberalization today with the 
diffusion of nationalization in the past.
Kurzfassung
Ist Europäisierung bedeutsam, und wenn ja, in welchem Ausmaß und in welcher Hinsicht? 
Während die Forschung zur Europäischen Union blüht und gedeiht, konnten bislang nur geringe 
Erfolge in Richtung einer Diskussion dieser entscheidenden Frage erzielt werden. Dieses Papier 
untersucht das Ergebnis des europäischen Politikprozesses aus verschiedenen vergleichenden 
Perspektiven im Bestreben, die "Nettoeffekte" der EU-Mitgliedschaft und Politik auf EU-Ebene 
von allgemeineren – vielleicht globalen – Veränderungsprozessen zu unterscheiden. Die Effekte 
der EU-Mitgliedschaft werden im Zusammenhang mit dem Prozess der Liberalisierung diskutiert 
und die Hauptfrage ist, ob Europäisierung für den Fortschritt der Liberalisierung von Bedeutung 
ist. In Beantwortung dieser Frage bringt dieses Papier das folgende Hauptargument vor: Während 
die Europäisierung der Telekom- und Elektrizitätsindustrien zu einer gewissen Liberalisierung 
geführt hat, ist dies bestenfalls eine vermittelnde Variable und keine unabhängige. Die 
Haupteigenschaften der Liberalisierung wären auch in Abwesenheit der Europäischen Kommission 
und anderer Vertreter des Supranationalismus in praktisch alle Mitgliedstaaten verbreitet worden. 
Dies soll nicht implizieren, dass die Europäisierung nicht von Bedeutung wäre, jedoch dass sie in 
weniger offensichtlichen und vielleicht weniger kritischen Wegen bedeutsam ist, als gemeinhin 
angenommen wird. Diese Argumente werden durch eine vergleichende empirische Analyse der 
räumlichen und zeitlichen Durchdringung der Liberalisierung quer durch Nationen und Sektoren 
sowie anhand eines Vergleichs der Verbreitung der Liberalisierung heute mit der Verbreitung der 
Nationalisierung in der Vergangenheit unterstützt.
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1 Introduction    
Does Europeanization matter, and, if so, to what extent and in what respects? While research on the 
European Union is thriving, only limited efforts have been directed towards a discussion of this 
fundamental question. Europeanists assume that the economic and political fruits of Europeanization 
are self-evident or, alternatively, that it is too difficult to untangle the complex interactions between 
liberalization and Europeanization. Indeed, this task is complex. The EU institutional structure seems 
to be ever evolving and ever-spreading, and its rapid advance in the last two decades has made it a 
moving target. Also, in the world of nation-states the European Union is unique and thus all the more 
puzzling. In addition, the course of the development of the EU is governed by complex procedures 
that result in multiple forms of governance that defy simple interpretations of the process, its 
sources, and its effects (for a skeptical account of our current state of knowledge, see especially 
Richardson, 2000; Scharpf, 2001). Not least problematic is the fact that since the 1980s 
Europeanization has interacted with radical structural changes in the governance of the capitalist 
economy. The crisis of the post-war order and the rapid advance of the global economy since the 
1970s are due to uni-dimensional forces that are anything but simple. Thus, the task of unravelling 
these complex processes is certainly not easy, yet it is unavoidable if one wishes to understand the 
transformation of governance in general and its European aspects in particular.  
This paper examines the outcome of the EU policy process from various comparative perspectives in 
an effort to distinguish the ‘net effects’ of EU-membership and EU-level governance from general 
and global processes of change. The effects of EU membership are discussed in relation to the 
process of liberalization; and the major question raised is whether Europeanization matters for the 
advance of liberalization. This issue is obviously only one aspect of the much broader process of 
Europeanization but it certainly not a minor one. In addition, the methodology of the study offers a 
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electricity industries has led to some liberalization, it is at best a mediating variable and not an 
independent one. The major features of liberalization would have been diffused to practically all 
member states even if the European Commission and other agents of supranationalism had not 
existed. This is not to suggest that Europeanization does not matter, but that it matters in less obvious 
and perhaps less critical ways than is frequently assumed as to the advance of liberalization. The 
argument is supported by comparative empirical analysis of the spatial and temporal diffusion of 
liberalization across nations and sectors and by a comparison of the diffusion of liberalization today 
with nationalization in the past.  
The empirical parts of the paper focus on two network industries: telecoms and electricity.(1) In the 
last two decades of the twentieth century these two industries experienced radical degrees of 
liberalization and Europeanization. Indeed, the extent of change in these two industries exceeds that 
of other infrastructures in the modern economy (e.g., post, gas, oil, railways, roads, airlines, and 
media).(2) Like other infrastructures, they were characterized by public ownership and monopolistic 
supply; yet, unlike other infrastructures, they have experienced Europeanization to an extent that 
makes them ‘most favorable’ cases for the argument that Europeanization has become a driving 
force in the transfer of liberalization across the member states. It is this dimension of the 
Europeanization of the two industries that makes them critical cases for students of Europeanization. 
If the argument for EU-driven liberalization is discredited for the most favorable cases of telecoms 
and electricity, it is even less likely to be supported in less favorable cases. In addition, despite 
experiencing a common and explicit trend towards liberalization and Europeanization, the telecoms 
regime has been more liberal and more ‘supranationalist’ than the electricity regime. These 
variations open an additional opportunity for comparative analysis and strengthen the plausibility of 
the paper’s argument. Moreover, telecoms and electricity together supply a good basis for empirical 
study, not least because they have attracted the attention of many scholars of liberalization. Finally, 
several comparative studies of the liberalization of telecoms and electricity in Europe have appeared 
in recent years (Schmidt, 1997; 1998; Levi-Faur, 1999b; Bartle, 1999; Coen, 2001; Padgett, 2001a), 
indicating an explosion of interest in the governance of these industries and confirming their 
‘theoretical value’ as most-favorable cases for the study of issues such as Commission activism, 
delegation to semi-independent regulatory authorities, and transnational lobbying. At the same time 
they supply a solid basis for theoretical debate that is based on overlapping empirical analysis.(3) 
Such a debate might be beneficial since many accounts have exaggerated the effects of 
Europeanization.  
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Indeed, according to some students of the European telecoms’ policy process, Europeanization in the 
form of a coalition between supranational institutions and business actors is the driving force behind 
liberalization. A plain statement to this effect has been made by Wayne Sandholtz: ”The evidence is 
clear: the EU has created a supranational policy domain in telecoms, and the initiative came 
primarily form the Commission, armed with legal precedents from the European Court of Justice and 
acting in alliance with societal groups that had a stake in efficient pan-European 
telecommunications” (Sandholtz, 1998, 135). Sandholtz's account of the power of the Commission is 
not exceptional, yet other accounts are skeptical of his views. Volker Schneider, for example, has 
argued that some countries (France and Germany, but not Italy) ”began to liberalize their 
telecommunications markets in response to global deregulation pressures. Thus, their liberalization 
efforts were made parallel to – and at times, in advance of – the emerging European policies. Hence, 
Europeanization produced less adaptational pressures in these countries” (Schneider, 2001, 61). Peter 
Humphreys stresses the ”the danger of focusing too much on the explanatory power of 
‘Europeanization’, and the institutional aspects of EU policy transfer, and not enough on the 
structural pressures arising from globalization” (Humphreys, 2001, 4; see also his much earlier 
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liberalization in telecoms is the outcome not only of Europeanization but also of globalization 
(Bartle, 1999, 378; Eliassen et al., 1999, 27; Natalicchi, 2001, 2). But while both effects have been 
acknowledged, no effort has been made to distinguish them empirically. The problem is certainly not 
unique to telecoms, and the only empirical effort to distinguish the effects of Europeanization from 
those of globalization has been made by Verdier and Breen (2001) in their study of various measures 
of interest intermediation.  
Most accounts of the process of electricity liberalization place special emphasis on the role of the 
European Commission and other EU-level actors. Rainer Eising and Nicolas Jabko, for example, 
have argued that the source of change in the preferences of the major EU member states is the EU 
process itself: ”National perceptions and positions evolved in response to the liberalization process at 
the EU level. Despite the considerable inertia of national electricity sectors, the member states’ 
involvement in EU negotiations opened the way for a reassessment of their electricity supply models 
and for a redefinition of their preferences. Ultimately, the formal and informal institutional dynamics 
of EU negotiations induced preference changes and political realignments at the domestic 
level” (Eising and Jabko, 2001, 743). Stephen Padgett writes ”that the findings… suggest that the 
EU’s multi-level institutional system has considerable transfer potential. Consequent upon EU 
initiative, a majority of member states now have a governance regime in the electricity sector, which 
replicates the essential features of the UK model” (Padgett, 2001b, 31). Beyond electricity but still in 
energy, Svein Andersen generalizes his study of the liberalization of natural gas by suggesting that, 
despite a weak organizational core, ”the EU system has a surprising ability to carry out radical 
reforms – even against the will of a majority of states” (Andersen, 2000, 19). Susanne Schmidt 
argues that the Commission has played important role in both industries but especially so in 
electricity (Schmidt, 1997, 265). Similarly, Vivien Schmidt, has argued that ”Here [i.e., in 
electricity], Europeanization was the main (institutional) pressure for liberalization, with the EU 
Commission the principal instigator of reform, and the EU decision-making process crucial in 
getting member-states to accept changes which for some went completely against their policy 
legacies and preferences” (Schmidt, 2001, 11).  
This paper offers an alternative to the common research designs in the study of Europe, which are 
usually Euro-centered in their case selection and generally bounded by the three common forms of 
small N analysis (case study; comparison of two sectors in one country; and, comparison of two 
countries as to one sector). I am far from doubting the view that the study of Europe ‘from within’ 
and small N analysis represent a highly important contribution to our understanding of political 
research in general and of the European political process in particular.(4) Still, the time is ripe to 
complement them by applying more complex designs to the study of European politics and policy. 
This is carried out here by combining four comparative perspectives. First, variations in ‘downward’ 
delegation of authority in telecoms and electricity are analysed and compared for all countries other 
than member states of the EU. This comparison helps us to demonstrate that cross-sectoral variations 
in ‘upward’ delegation in the EU reflect global tendencies rather than uniquely European outcomes. 
Second, a most-different-research design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) is employed to compare 14 
out of the 15 member states of the EU(5) with 16 Latin American states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela—hereafter LA16). Since the Latin American countries 
differ considerably in their state traditions, level of economic development, democratic stability, and 
the efficiency of their bureaucracies, they offer a remarkably different perspective on the effects of 
EU membership. Third, a most-similar-research design is employed as well. The EU member states 
studied here (hereafter EU14) are compared with a group of eight most-similar countries (Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Israel, Japan, and the USA, hereafter the Democratic 
& Rich Group of Eight, or D&R8 for short). These eight economically developed countries enjoy 
stable democratic regimes and have relatively efficient bureaucracies; and they supplied an 
additional test for the evaluation of the extent to which Europeanization matters in the diffusion of 
liberalization. Finally, a comparative historical analysis is undertaken whereby the diffusion of 
telecoms and electricity privatization since the 1980s is compared with the diffusion of telecoms and 
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If ‘Europeanization matters’, that is, if it has a ‘net impact’ on the process of change in the 
governance of the telecoms and electricity industries, one should expect support for most or all of the 
following five hypotheses:  
1. First, one should expect different patterns of liberalization across Europe from those of two 
other groups of countries. This hypothesis is examined against data on (a) ownership (timing, 
scope and extent of privatization); (b) the establishment of sector-specific regulatory 
authorities (timing and nominal independence); (c) the creation of regulatory regimes for the 
promotion of competition (wholesale and retail competition).  
2. Second, Europeanization would matter not only in sectors that are prone to liberalization but 
also in those that are not. This hypothesis is examined against cross-sectoral analysis of the 
processes and outcomes of liberalization and Europeanization in telecoms and electricity.  
3. Third, one should expect Europeanization to have an effect on all or at least most member 
states. This hypothesis is examined though aggregate measures of liberalization and 
Europeanization. This allows us to move from case studies and deterministic causal analysis to 
descriptive statistics of the group’s characteristics such as the mean and the median.  
4. Fourth, one should expect that Europeanization would matter not only for indicators of 
liberalization that are most favorable to Europeanization but also for those that are not. This 
hypothesis is discussed against three indicators of Europeanization – ownership policies, 
sector-specific regulatory authorities, and competition regimes. The three indicators differ in 
the degree to which they have been subjected to EU legislation and thus supply valuable 
comparative leverage in the study of the relations between Europeanization and liberalization. 
5. Finally, one should expect that the convergence of the EU14 group on the desired governance 
regime would be stronger nowadays than in the past. This hypothesis is examined against a 
comparative analysis of the diffusion of nationalization in these sectors in the past with the 
diffusion of privatization nowadays.  
2 Conceptualizing Change: The Analytical Framework   
Distinguishing Europeanization from liberalization is a precondition for any empirical analysis. The 
task is complex not least because the two concepts have few dimensions. This part of the paper first 
clarifies their meaning and then spells out their interaction in the transformation of the telecoms and 
electricity regimes. Liberalization is defined here as the promotion of a market economy via private 
ownership and competitive allocation of resources. Thus, a positive step towards liberalization may 
include one or more of the following policy measures: privatization, deregulation, regulation-of-
competition, regulation-for-competition, and the establishment of separate and independent 
regulatory authorities (Levi-Faur, 1999b).  
Each of these components of liberalization might be implemented separately. In practice, however, 
there are highly correlated. Privatization is the transfer of ownership from public to private hands.(7)
Deregulation is the elimination of economic, political, and social restrictions on the behavior of 
business. It differs from two others components of liberalization – regulation-of-competition and 
regulation-for-competition – that are often confused with it. While deregulation aims to strengthen 
market processes and competition by the removal of political constraints, regulation-of-competition 
and regulation-for-competition aim to promote competition via the enforcement of roles through 
administrative controls. Regulation-of-competition and regulation-for-competition differ in their 
degree of intervention. While both require the establishment and the strengthening of governance 
capacities, regulation-for-competition requires far more intrusive capacities. This is best indicated by 
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competition and the sector-specific responsibilities of regulatory authorities in the case of regulation-
for-competition. The broader responsibilities of national competition authorities give them less 
influence on market actors who know their industry better. These broader responsibilities also imply 
that competition authorities adopt a reactive approach to anti-competitive measures. In regulation-
for-competition, the responsibilities of regulatory authorities are narrowly confined to a sector or 
industry but they usually give those authorities much more influence over market actors. Unlike the 
reactive approach of competition authorities, these sector-specific authorities are proactive and 
involved in market design and market control to an unprecedented extent.(8)  
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Europeanization, like liberalization, has many facets. These reflect its popularity as a topic of 
political analysis, but render it a contested concept. So contested has it become that Kasim argues 
that it is futile to use it as an organizing concept (Kassim, 2000, 235). Johan Olsen, however, has 
responded recently by suggesting that it may be premature to abandon the term, and made an attempt 
to clarify some of its meanings and to point to the various processes that promote them (Olsen, 
2002). Europeanization, according to Olsen, might be used in five different ways: (1) changes in 
external territorial boundaries; (2) the development of institutions of governance at the European 
level; (3) central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance; (4) exporting forms 
of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe; (5) a political 
project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe (ibid.). In this paper, Europeanization is 
understood as the development of institutions of governance at the European level (Olsen’s third 
meaning of Europeanization)(9) and its impact is examined with regard to the suggestion that it may 
result in distinct European outcomes (Olsen’s fourth meaning of Europeanization).  
Since the advance of Europeanization is uneven across sectors and policy arenas, it might be useful 
to distinguish two forms of Europeanization — intergovernmental and supranational — according to 
the degree to which they involve transfer of control to extra-national institutions. While 
intergovernmental and supranational regimes both involve ‘upward’ transfer of control, the former 
have specific provisions that guarantee room for maneuver and autonomy of policy makers at the 
national level. In other words, the design of an intergovernmental regime allows more national 
discretion than does that of a supranational regime (Levi-Faur, 1999b). In addition to these two 
formal regimes, at the European level it might be also useful to point to the possibility of 
Europeanization via the informal consolidation of norms of behavior. Unlike the cases of 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, where contractual commitments exist among the parties 
and there are distinct and specific mechanisms for dispute resolution and enforcement, 
Europeanization through informal regimes is based only on common norms, mutual trust, and 
minimal conflict of interest among the actors of the regime.  
The legislative leverage that the EU enjoys over each of the components of liberalization varies 
considerably. The EU actors from the Judiciary to the Commission have no authority over the 
ownership of the means of production (that is, public or private property), little authority over 
governance issues at the national level, and wide authority on competition issues. In what follows we 
shed light on some of these issues, starting with privatization. According to article 222 of the Treaty 
of Rome, privatization is outside the jurisdiction of the treaty and cannot be subject to either an 
intergovernmental or a supranational regime. The language of the article is very clear and leaves 
little room for doubt: ”This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing 
the system of property ownership.” Thus, the scope for Europeanization of this important aspect of 
any governance regime is very narrow since it would require a ‘constitutional’ change that seems 
unlikely or at best remote. 
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legislative power. Yet, unlike with ownership, no provision is found in the various treaties governing 
the EU that prevents the legislative bodies from requiring the member states to establish such 
authorities. While all member states except Germany have established such authorities, they have 
done so spontaneously and not in compliance with any part of the electricity directive of 1996. 
Indeed, the Commission is at present trying to oblige member states to establish national regulatory 
authorities in electricity.(10) A directive proposed by the Commission in March 2001 and still 
pending at the European Parliament declares that ”Member States shall establish national regulatory 
authorities. These authorities shall be wholly independent of interests of the electricity 
industry” (article 22). This part of the directive will most probably be opposed by the member states, 
but not because they oppose the idea itself. After all, with the exception of Germany all of them have 
already established separate regulators for electricity. Opposition might arise from the desire of the 
member states to protect their ”institutional autonomy”, that is, ”the right of the member states to 
perform the tasks that stem from membership of the EU on the basis of their own constitutional 
rules” (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001, 444).  
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The components of liberalization concerned with competition (deregulation and regulation of and for
competition) have always been within the jurisdiction of the Union's supranational structure. 
Specifically, there is a growing and very clear trend to apply it to the infrastructure of the European 
economies. The authority of the EU in these matters rests directly on the principle of ‘a single 
market’ and specifically on article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome, which requires member states to 
ensure that ”competition in the common market is not distorted”. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome goes 
even farther, and prohibits cartels (article 85) and monopolies (article 86) (see Cini and McGowan, 
1998). Since 1989 mergers have also been within the competency of the EU. Competition policy is 
”the central means towards the fundamental goals laid down in the Rome Treaty” (McGowan and 
Wilks, 1995, 141). While the authority of the EU regarding these issues is generally indisputable, the 
form of Europeanization of these sectors is a matter for bargaining – especially in respect of public 
services (Nicolaides, 1998). Consequently, the following four outcomes of the European policy 
process are possible: 
a. no Europeanization at all;  
b. informal regime;  
c. intergovernmental regime, and  
d. supranational regime.  
3 Strategies of Liberalization and Europeanization   
Table 1 presents EU-level policy choice as to the form of Europeanization and the strategy of 
liberalization. The table is partly grounded in a study of liberalization strategies in five micro 
regimes of the two sectors (telecoms equipment, interconnection, generation, transmission, and 
distribution: see Levi-Faur, 1999b). The study suggests that, while there are clear differences in the 
extent of Europeanization across the sectors, intra-sector variations exist in the components of 
liberalization within each of them. Thus, the EU telecoms equipment regime experienced 
deregulation but the infrastructure of telecoms ‘transport’ was subject to regulation-for-competition. 
In the electricity sector, regulation-of-competition governed the generation of electricity but 
transmission and distribution were subject to regulation-for-competition. Column 1 shows those 
aspects of the liberalization process that were outside the reach of the EU or where there was no EU 
regime. It covers privatization in both sectors and highlights the absence of EU legislative leverage 
over this component.  
Seite 6 von 20 EIoP: Text 2002-007: Full Text
22.04.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-007.htmColumn 2 of Table 1 shows the aspects of liberalization where informal regimes, based on trust and 
common conceptions of best practices, were chosen to propel the process of Europeanization. Since 
none of the telecoms and electricity directives obliged the member states to establish regulatory 
authorities, and since the member states did so in both sectors with amazing uniformity (again, with 
the exception of German electricity), it is suggested that this aspect of the process of liberalization is 
governed by an ”informal European regime”.  
Columns 3 and 4 show ”positive” cases of Europeanization and distinguish intergovernmentalism in 
electricity from supranationalism in telecoms. As was suggested above, the analytical basis of the 
distinction is the extent of the transfer of control upward from the member states to the EU. The 
lesser degree of transfer of control in electricity and thus its intergovernmentalism is evident in the 
wide discretion of member states that is recognized by the electricity directive. The 
intergovernmentalism of electricity is manifest in four critical elements: the access regime, the 
transportation tariffs regime, the reciprocity clause, and the rule that governs distribution companies. 
First, the directive allows member states to opt either for a Third Party Access principle or for Single 
Buyer status. In the former case, consumers or suppliers negotiate the terms of access with the 
operator of the grid, while in the latter case a single national operator will handle all requests for 
import and will be directly responsible for the supply of electricity to the consumers. Second, the 
directive opens the way for a member state to choose a system of negotiated or regulated access. 
Here the question of tariffs takes centre stage. The generators and the consumers are critically 
dependent on the grid operator, which may abuse its power. Here, member states can leave the 
question of tariffs and conditions of access to the ”market” (neg. TPA) or regulate it (reg. TPA). 
Clearly, only the second case provides safeguards to competition, but the directive allows member 
states to avoid competition and Europeanization.  
6
Table 1  
Third, a reciprocity clause allows member states, up to a period of nine years, to restrict import of 
electricity from countries that do not open their markets to the same extent. Finally, the issue of 
whether to allow distribution companies to shop freely for the electricity they distribute was left to 
the discretion of the member states. This is a critical aspect of competition as the distribution 
companies are well-placed to exert pressure on generators and transmission operators in order to get 
their electricity at cheaper costs. This element again reinforces the intergovernmental features of the 
distribution regime and in fact of the electricity sector as a whole (Levi-Faur, 1999b). None such 
discretion is visible in telecoms, so it is possible to suggest that the governance regime in telecoms is 
more supranational than in electricity.  
4 Upward and Downward Delegation: The EU vs. the Rest of 
the World   
To what extent is the relative reluctance to transfer control upward in electricity unique to Europe? Is 
there something in electricity that makes politicians in general –not only EU politicians – less 
enthusiastic to transfer control than in telecoms? It would help if there were ”additional EUs” 
somewhere in the world, but as unfortunately there are not we must devise another strategy to 
answer this question. We suggest that a more comprehensive picture of the uniqueness of the 
European policy outcomes may be gained by examining patterns of ‘downward delegation’ in the 
two industries around the world. Delegation is transfer of control; it may involve transfer of controls 
from national-level policy makers to international institutions (upward) or as in the case of the 
transfer of control from policy makers at the national level to separate sector-specific regulatory 
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act of delegation. The extent of delegation downward varies from case to case (a case might be a 
country or a sector) and across time, and, as it is manifested in formal as well as informal rules of 
conduct, it is extremely hard to measure.(11) Yet crude measures of ‘delegation downward’ might be 
useful for our purposes. Table 2 presents two features of the new institutional design that is emerging 
across the utilities. The first feature is the growing tendency – usually explained as a reflection of 
best-governance practice – to create separate and sector-specific regulatory agencies to govern the 
industry. The second reflects even greater commitment to keeping politicians at arm's length from 
the regulators through the creation of an institutional mechanism that will ensure the fiscal and legal 
autonomy of the regulator.  
Table 2 shows the propensity of countries that are not members of the EU to ‘delegate downward’ in 
the two sectors. Evidently, policy makers outside the EU tend to create more separate regulatory 
authorities in telecoms than in electricity (68% and 38% respectively). When they establish these 
regulators they tend to give them nominal independence to a greater degree in telecoms than in 
electricity (74% and 55% respectively). Levi-Faur (2002) offers a political explanation for this 
tendency that stresses the greater political reward and lesser political risks that are involved in the 
liberalization of telecoms than in electricity. However, the source of these sectoral differences is not 
a concern of this paper, since what is interesting and suggestive is that there is co-variation between 
the extent of transfer upward in Europe and the patterns of transfer of control downward to national 
regulatory authorities. This suggests that the source of the variations across the EU’s telecoms and 
electricity regime lies not in the EU policy process but in the way policy makers worldwide perceive 
the costs and benefits of transferring control in each of the sectors.  
Table 2  
The comparison of ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ delegation across the sectors, and the ensuing 
suggestion that variations in policy outcomes reflect the responsiveness of the Europeanization 
process to global patterns of costs benefit calculations, is somewhat indirect. More direct evidence 
on the impact of Europeanization might be obtained through comparison of the results at the national 
level inside and outside the EU. If Europeanization is driving the process of liberalization, one would 
expect significant variations in the process of liberalization between members and non-members of 
the EU. This issue is discussed in the next section of the paper.  
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4.1 Europeanization in Most Similar and Most Different Perspectives   
Table 3 presents some indicators of liberalization for the EU14, LA16, and D&R8 groups and for the 
two sectors. These indicators allow us to compare the EU members with Latin America, providing a 
most-different perspective on the process of liberalization and therefore a most-favorable design for 
the argument that ”Europe matters”. At the same time Europe is compared with a group of eight 
democratic and relatively rich countries (providing a most-similar perspective on the process of 
liberalization and therefore a least-favorable case for the argument that ”Europe matters”). If 
”Europe matters” one should easily observe different patterns of liberalization in the EU group 
compared with Latin America. We expect that the variations across the most-similar groups of EU14 
and D&R8 will be more difficult to discern but these variations will provide more robust support for 
the argument that ”Europe matters” than the differences that will be found, if at all, with LA16 
group.  
Let us first examine the issue of ownership across the three groups of countries. The number of 
privatization events – which record the decision to sell part of the dominant telecoms or electricity 
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countries studied here privatized at least some of their major operators, only 62% of the Latin 
American group did so (10 countries out of 16). In electricity the Latin American group seems to 
show a somewhat greater propensity for privatization. The indicator of the timing of telecoms 
privatization suggests that the EU14 group lag two years behind Latin America (the summary 
statistics for the mean and the median reflect the same conclusion).(12) In electricity, however, EU 
member states were quicker to move ahead, with median years of 1991 and 1995 respectively (again, 
the groups’ median and the mean suggest similar conclusion). The structure of ownership, which was 
very similar across these two groups of countries and in both sectors in 1975, seems to become even 
more similar in 2000. The differences in the telecoms sector between the mostly private structure in 
Europe and the mixed structure in Latin America are less visible when the actual scores are 
examined (3.71 for the EU and only 3.2 for Latin America).(13) Overall the similarities in the two 
groups seem to be much more robust than the differences.  
Table 3 
We stay with the ownership aspect of liberalization but move on to discuss the EU and the D&R8 
groups (Columns [1] and [3]). The results confirm the observation of ‘no effects’ on ownership by 
EU’s membership. In both sectors there are minimal variations in the extent, scope, and timing of 
privatization. Most interesting is the finding that the variations between the 14 EU member states 
and the two remarkably different groups of Latin America and D&R8 are similar. The privatization 
of telecoms and electricity industries is so sweeping that the effects of variations in state traditions, 
level of economic development, political institutions, and public preferences seem to have minimal 
effects on the advance of liberalization. However, since EU institutions have no leverage over the 
extent of privatization, one may argue, reasonably, that this is not the best indicator of 
Europeanization. Yet if ”the EU matters”, and if we are interested in the overall effects of EU 
membership, ownership patterns still supply an important indication of the marginal role of the EU-
level process. One has to admit, however, that it is not the most important possible indicator. 
Moreover, privatization, while outside the legislative power of the EU, is a relatively convenient 
indicator of the sweeping spread of liberalization as a global process that is not dictated by any 
political institution ‘above the nation-state’ but reflects common perceptions across policy makers. 
Thus, it helps us to dispel misconceptions about the role of the Commission and other supranational 
actors at the EU level promoting liberalization against the will of the nation states (Grande, 1994, 
Levi-Faur, 1999a)  
Let us now discuss the issue of regulatory authorities, beginning with a comparison of the EU and 
the LA groups. Again there are significant similarities in the incidence of regulatory authorities 
across the two groups. In telecoms, 100% of the countries in the two groups established regulatory 
authorities. In electricity, there was somewhat less consistency but still an impressive majority opted 
for this institutional innovation (outside the United States and Canada): in the EU 86% of the 14 
member states studied here did so, while in Latin America 81% established regulatory authorities. 
The difference of 5% seems safely within the range of statistical error. A similar picture emerges 
from the data on the median and mean years for the establishment of regulatory authorities. Latin 
America seems to have moved earlier than the EU but the gaps are relatively narrow (1 to 3 years). 
The first exception in this picture of cross-group similarities is the reluctance of Latin American 
policy makers to grant independence to their separate regulatory institutions. This reluctance to 
delegate in Latin America is evident across both sectors, and the variations are big enough to suggest 
a qualitative difference in this respect between the two groups of countries.  
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Still on the issue of regulatory authorities, we move on to a comparison of the EU and the D&R8 
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across the two groups and the two sectors are remarkably different but the tendency to delegate is 
remarkably similar. More specifically, the members of D&R8 varied considerably on the decision to 
create regulatory authorities. The USA adopted this method in order to preserve its private 
ownership structure from the mid-1930s. The Canadians followed in the 1970s, but the New 
Zealanders refused until recently to consider regulatory authorities a legitimate part of the 
liberalization program. It is, however, remarkable that when the D&R8 group created regulatory 
authorities it allowed similar degrees of nominal independence for them.(14)  
Thus, on the extent and timing of the creation of regulatory authorities we found similarities with 
Latin America (where we expected differences) and differences from D&R8 (where we expected 
similarities). Expectations of similarities and variations were, however, confirmed as regards the 
independence of the regulatory authorities. To what extent do these data confirm the hypothesis that 
the ”EU matters”? The answer is that they do not support it. The general tendency in the 1990s to 
create separate regulatory authorities is in no way a European phenomenon and the variations 
between the EU member states and the D&R8 group should not be overemphasized. Much more 
important - and much more telling about the limits of the arguments that Europeanization determines 
liberalization – is the finding that the propensity to grant independence to regulatory authorities is 
similar across the two groups. Again, as in the case of privatization, the case for significant effects of 
EU-membership on the patterns of liberalization is weak.  
More remarkable differences between the EU and the LA groups are evident with regard to the 
indicators of competition. Here, where the EU institutions have the largest leverage over 
liberalization outcomes, one indeed finds qualitative differences between the two groups of countries 
in the emphasis on competition. While all the EU member-states opened their international market to 
competition, only seven of the 16 Latin American countries did so. While all EU member states 
opened their local telecoms loop to competition, only one of the Latin American countries did. 
Similarly, in the electricity sector the Latin American countries are behind the EU in opening the 
transmission networks and in supplying the regulatory framework that is essential for retail 
competition. This might be interpreted as striking evidence of the effects of EU membership, yet the 
Latin American comparison is a most-favorable case for the assertion that the EU matter with regard 
to the spread of liberalization policies. Some skepticism might be in order here. For example, it is 
highly plausible that these variations are a product of different levels of economic development (to 
suggest just one possibility) rather than of EU membership. Specifically, it might be argued that 
retail competition makes economic sense only when there is universal access to the telecoms and 
electricity networks in Latin America. Variations between Europe and the D&R8 group would 
provide more significant support for the hypothesis that ”the EU matters”;. Yet such variations are 
hardly to be found. There are almost none between the two groups of countries in the telecoms 
sector. The variations in the extent of regulation-for-competition in electricity are more significant 
but they do not display a definite pattern. The EU member states moved more decisively towards a 
competitive regime in the opening of the transmission network but they lagged behind the D&R8 
group with regard to retail competition.  
All in all, we found no convincing or conclusive evidence to support the suggestion that EU 
membership has made a critical difference in the transfer of liberalization across the world. In fact, 
we found more evidence to support the view that the EU does not matter in this respect than to refute 
it. We can safely suggest that it matters less than is often assumed or explicitly stated in the 
literature. All this suggests that the EU is not the major force driving liberalization since 
liberalization is just about omnipresent and Europe as a group has lagged behind other significant 
actors in moving to liberalize.  
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Additional insights into the question of whether Europe matters may be gained from comparative 
historical analysis. Since the current wave of liberalization is unprecedented in the history of 
telecoms and electricity, it is necessary to classify liberalization as a governance regime and to 
compare its diffusion across Europe with the diffusion of former governance regimes. This road is 
taken in this section of the paper, which compares the diffusion of liberalization today with the 
diffusion of nationalization across the EU member states before the establishment of the EU. As will 
be demonstrated, clear indications are found of interdependencies between the decision of one 
country to nationalize and the decisions of others to take the same course. In many countries, and for 
the most of the 20th century, nationalization, not privatization, was considered the ‘best practice’ for 
the governance of the telecoms and electricity industries. The influence of ‘nationalization’ as ‘a best 
practice’ was so strong that some countries opted for it as late as the end of the 1970s. Snow’s study 
of the depth of belief in the natural monopoly characteristics of the telecoms industry among the 
economists of the German competition authority just a few years before the first cracks in this 
assumption became apparent tells the story of entrenched beliefs that nationalization is the best way 
to govern telecoms provision (Snow, 1988). Even before liberalization, nations and policy makers 
learned from each other and made use of each others’ actions in order to gain legitimacy and power 
in their own countries. Yet, as will be demonstrated soon, there are important differences between 
the diffusion of liberalization and the diffusion of telecoms nationalization (since the late 19th 
century) and electricity nationalization (since the inter-war period).  
Figure 1 Figure 2  Figure 3  
Figure 1 presents the diffusion of nationalization and liberalization across the 14 EU member states 
in both telecoms and electricity. Consider first the patterns of the diffusion of nationalization. 
Telecoms and electricity were developed technologically and commercially in about the same decade 
(1876 and 1882 respectively), yet European policy makers chose to nationalize telecoms first and to 
move towards the nationalization of electricity only decades later. Indeed, in some countries, notably 
Germany, telecoms was introduced commercially to the country as a state monopolistic service from 
the very beginning of the industry (Schneider, 1997; Levi-Faur, 2002). A critical moment followed 
the decision of the British Postmaster-General to advance the case that ‘telephone is sort of a 
telegraph’ and therefore subject to the control of the government under the Telegraph Act of 1869 
(Meyer, 1907).(15) The confirmation of this decision by a British court did not lead directly to 
government provision of the telephone service since it was well within the authority of the 
Postmaster-General to grant concessions to private companies. For a while it seemed that other 
countries would follow the British example of government control through concessions to private 
companies. Indeed, in the early years many countries seemed to replicate the British decision to 
place the telephone under the control of their postmasters. Yet it was not long before Belgium, 
Austria, Sweden, France, and Denmark made deep inroads into the field of telephony through the 
nationalization of the entire industry or through control of critical strategic assets such as the long-
distance networks. At the end of 1911 the British nationalized their telephone services, thus 
practically sealing the future of commercial telephone services in Europe. Spain and Portugal were 
exceptional in that they nationalized their industries very late, and Mussolini’s Italy made an attempt 
(that failed) to reinvigorate the commercial provision of telephony.  
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Public (municipal) ownership in the electricity industry started to spread slowly from the very 
beginning of the industry (Hannah, 1979; Hughes, 1983; Kajjser and Hedin, 1995; Millward, 2000). 
As in the case of early transport and water systems, an electricity concession was usually a 
precondition for the provision of electricity and thus they were given to concessionaires according to 
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important, such as a promise to give the municipality a share of the revenue or the supply of an 
adequate level of public service,. A range of service problems with the provision of electricity as 
well as a rising tide of ‘municipal pride’ and socialism led gradually to the municipalization of 
electricity services in many small and big cities around Europe. Yet, unlike telecoms, the provision 
of electricity remained for a long time under private ownership. The advance of the state in this area 
came relatively late, through the construction of large hydroelectric and irrigation projects or the 
promotion of national high-voltage transmission networks.(16) Indeed, governments in most 
countries made inroads into electricity during the inter-war period. The Finns moved towards state 
entrepreneurship in this sector in 1921. The new Irish republic nationalized electricity provision in 
1927. Still, state ownership was not to become the dominant pattern until the end of the Second 
World War.(17) Most remarkable were the comprehensive state monopolies created right after the 
Second World War by France (1946), Britain (1947), Greece (1955), and Italy (1962). Again, as in 
the case of telephone, Spain and Portugal were exceptional and nationalized their electricity 
industries very late.(18)  
The diffusion of privatization since the 1980s appears to have advanced much faster than the 
diffusion of nationalization. Within a span of two decades all 14 EU member states privatized their 
telecoms industries, and eight did the same with their electricity industries.(19) The process of 
change in the telecoms industry started with the privatization of British Telecom in 1984 (a 
significant precedent for this step was the privatization in 1981 of the former provider of telecoms 
services to the British empire, Cable and Wireless). It took a decade for other EU member states to 
follow suit. In 1992 the Danes partly privatized their telecoms operator, and they were quickly 
followed by all the other dozen EU members studied here. In electricity the process started with the 
privatization of the shares of the German Federal government in electricity supply in 1984. Over the 
next four year none of the other EU member states followed the German example. In 1988 the 
federal government in Austria and the Spanish government privatized some of their electricity assets. 
In 1991 Britain and Sweden privatized electricity, and were followed in the second half of the 1990s 
by Portugal, Italy, and the Netherlands.  
It might be tempting, in view of the more rapid diffusion in the era of liberalization, to argue that 
Europeanization has created stronger interdependencies between the member states. Yet there is little 
support for this suggestion when the matter is examined in cross-national perspective. We rest our 
case here with Figure 2 and Figure 3. Starting with Figure 2, we leave the historical perspective and 
return to a cross-group comparison. The graph presents the rates of diffusion of privatization for the 
EU and LA groups. The proximity of the lines that describe the cumulative trends of privatization in 
the two groups demonstrates that the EU process is in no way exceptional. It may also suggest that 
there are growing interdependencies between units of the international system and not necessarily 
between constitutive units of the EU. If the diffusion of privatization in Latin America is as rapid as 
in Europe, it is not plausible to argue that the EU accelerates the process of privatization.  
A similar pattern is evident when progress in the establishment of regulatory authorities across the 
two groups is studied. Figure 3 presents the progress of regulatory authorities in both groups in the 
two sectors. The gaps between the two lines represent the variations in the process of diffusion. The 
gaps are wider than in the case of privatization (see Figure 2) but the process is still dominated by 
similarities rather than differences. Here we come closer than with the privatization indicator to the 
EU-level policy agenda, but still there is no clear evidence that "the EU matters" to the progress of 
liberalization.  
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6 Conclusions
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liberalization, it was a mediating factor rather than an independent one. The major features of the 
liberalization process would have diffused to practically all member states even if the Commission 
and other agents of Europeanization had not existed. This rather thin interpretation of the effects of 
the European policy process is based on four major observations. First, variations in ‘upward 
delegation’ to the European level largely correspond to variations in the ‘downward delegation’ in 
these two industries. This pattern of change suggests that policy outcomes at the EU level reflect 
rather than dictate national policy outcomes. Second, policy choices at the national and sectoral 
levels with regard to the establishment of regulatory authorities and privatization reveal clear 
preferences for liberalization at the national level. This is particularly important since these 
components of Europeanization were outside the jurisdiction of the EU. Third, policy choices at the 
national and sectoral levels in the EU member states were not remarkably different for the EU14 
group when compared with the most-similar group (D&R8) and the most-different group (LA16). 
Fourth, historical patterns of diffusion of governance change reveal that the interdependence 
between countries in the choice of governance mechanism is not a novel feature of the international 
system and world political economy. Certain mechanisms of policy emulation served to induce 
convergence across European countries in the past even without EU-level mechanisms of policy 
transfer.  
These observations seem to support the much more general rebuke to exaggerating the effects of 
European-level politics and policy making suggested by Bomberg and Peterson:  
Research on Europeanization needs to avoid the sort of sociology of knowledge problems that can 
arise when a group of scholars become so preoccupied with a certain political phenomenon that they 
start to find it where it does not really exist, and over-estimate its effects where it does (Bomberg and 
Peterson, 2000, 39).  
None of this means that Europeanization is an illusion. There is a real and to some extent effective 
governance structure in Brussels, which will make a real impact on the way telecoms and electricity 
are governed in Europe in the future. Yet this real governance structure seems to be led by 
liberalization rather than to lead it. This conclusion is somewhat refined by the following six 
suggestions that aim to capture cross-sectoral and cross-national variations in the ability of 
Europeanization to shape liberalization outcomes as well as in the propensity of different indicators 
of policy outcome to reflect the effects of Europeanization.  
First, while the paper’s conclusion applies to both sectors, it is more valid in the telecoms sector than 
in electricity. The effect of EU membership, while not decisive and while not independent of 
processes outside Europe, is stronger in the move to liberalize the electricity sector than the telecoms 
sector (cf. Schmidt, 1997, 265; Schmidt, 2001, 11).  
Second, while the paper’s conclusion applies to all member states, it is more valid in some countries 
than in others. Specifically, the effect of Europeanization on liberalization, while not critically 
important, is stronger in the southern countries and perhaps in France than in northern Europe. This 
proposition confirms to some extent a conclusion reached by Volker Schneider: Europeanization was 
more important in Italy than in France and Germany (Schneider, 2001, 61).(20) One may add on the 
basis of studies of the liberalization process in east Europe that the role of the Commission and EU-
level considerations in the promotion of liberalization among the east European candidates for 
accession was stronger than it was among the EU member states (cf. Mayhew, 1998; Nunberg, 2000; 
Jacoby, 2001).  
Third, while the first proposition applies to all the components of the liberalization program, it does 
not apply equally to them. Privatization of ownership and the widespread move towards the creation 
of independent regulatory authorities are less the product of Europeanization than of the advance of 
retail competition (unbundling in telecoms and consumer choice of suppliers in electricity). Yet the 
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among the member states than elsewhere in the most-similar groups of the D&R8.  
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Fourth, while EU membership served as a catalyst for liberalization in some countries, it delayed the 
process for most of the members as it relieved them of some pressures to move faster. In this sense 
the EU has acted both as a conduit for global forces and as a shield against them (Schmidt, 2002, 
Chapter 1).  
Fifth, it is important to distinguish between the pre- and the post-liberalization effects of 
Europeanization. The post-liberalization effects of Europeanization might be more important than 
the pre-liberalization effects. The nature of reforms – more rules and more competition – gives 
political actors potential leverage over market outcomes and a powerful position vis- à -vis business. 
The process of Europeanization may not be responsible for the advance of liberalization, yet it has 
created another layer of political control that may be able to check and to restrict abuse of power by 
national and European actors.  
Sixth, the post-liberalization effects of Europeanization are more important for some sectors and 
countries than others. Specifically, Europeanization may be a critical factor in sustaining future 
competitive regimes in electricity more than in telecoms, in etatist countries more than in liberal 
ones, and in countries that have incompetent bureaucracies more than in countries that are lucky 
enough to have competent bureaucracies.  
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Appendix  
Telecoms 
Printed material for the telecom cases include:, Books by Noam (1992; 1998), Petrazzini (1995), 
Molano (1997) and Manzetti (1999) and paper by Wellenius (2000). In addition, interviews and e-
mail exchanges with regulatory authorities and ministries were used such as EU regulatory 
developments (http://www.ispo.cec.be), the ITU regulatory database (http://www.itu.int/ITU-D-
TREG/), OECD (http://www.oecd.org/subject/regreform/) and World Bank Papers on Regulatory 
Reforms (http://econ.worldbank.org/topic.php?topic=14).  
Telecoms’ nationalization: Various accounts of a country’s economic developments and online 
histories by a country’s incumbents and by government agencies. Bennett, (1895); Holcombe, 
(1911); Noam (1992) Forman-Peck and Muller (1988).  
Electricity 
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22.04.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-007.htmPrinted sources in the electricity cases include Pollitt (1997), Bacon (1999) Gilbert and Kahn (1996), 
several publications of the IEA (1996; 2001), and the Financial Times Energy (1995; 1997, 1998). 
Invaluable material was collected in the library of the International Institute of Energy Law, the 
University of Leiden. Interviews and e-mail exchanges with regulatory authorities and ministries. 
Online energy information of the US Department of Energy 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html) as well as the Electricity Project of the Catholic 
University of Chile (http://www2.ing.puc.cl/power/) and the OECD 
(http://www.oecd.org/subject/regreform/) and World Bank Papers on Regulatory Reforms 
(http://econ.worldbank.org/topic.php?topic=14 )  
Electricity’s nationalization: Various accounts of a country’s economic developments and online 
histories by a country’s incumbents and by government agencies.  
Endnotes  
(*) This paper had benefited from talks and email communication with Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos, 
Burkard Eberlein, Nicolas Phedeon, Marcel Haag, Johan P. Olsen, Jeremy Richardson and Colin 
Scot. I would also like to express special thanks to Rainer Eising, Nicolas Jabko, Johannes Lindner, 
Berthold Rittberger and Susanne Schmidt who read a draft of this paper and contribute valuable 
comments. My thanks go as well to the two anonymous referees of the EIoP. All usual disclaimers 
apply. 
(1) Network industries are built around distribution pipelines that are an economically critical 
strategic resource. Other examples are water, gas, broadcasting, and telegraph.  
(2) Unfortunately there are no quantitative measures of Europeanization across sectors. Still, there is 
wide recognition that Europeanization has advanced more radically in telecoms and electricity than 
in other infrastructures. See, for example, Henry and Matheu (2001), p. 20.  
(3) In a critical account of the state in the field of European politics, Susanne Schmidt points to three 
critical problems in the study of the European policy process: (i) case-specific findings, which are 
too specific to allow for generalization; (ii) dichotomous theoretical perspectives, which do not allow 
a refined view of the integration process; and (iii) the rarity of overlapping research, which 
constrains empirical and theoretical debate (Schmidt, 1997). I couldn't agree more, although I would 
add the problems of Eurocentrism and too conservative research designs.  
(4) Indeed there are promising developments in Small-N analysis. See the site of "Comparative 
methods, Small N, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-sets (fs/QCA)international 
resource site" http://smallN.spri.ucl.ac.be/ as well as the site of ”the Inter-University Faculty 
Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods” http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/index.html  
(5) Luxembourg was excluded from my database, which includes states with a population of above 
one million people .  
(6) It is obvious that our research design does not follow statistical procedures of random sampling; 
yet the careful selection of cases maximizes the power of explanation and the validity of conclusions 
when one considers the alternatives of employing inferential statistics or small-N methods of 
analysis.  
(7) See Hodge (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of various meanings and aspects of 
privatization.  
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22.04.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-007.htm(8) Steven Vogel (1996) expressed it nicely: ‘freer market more rules’.  
(9) A facet of Europeanization that was also singled out by Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, who 
defined it as ”the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance” (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001, 3).  
(10) Commission’s proposal of 13 March 2001 available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/internal-market/int-market.html  
(11) The most impressive effort to measure degrees of independence was made by Alex Cukierman 
(1992). For critical account of the various approaches that aim to measure independence, see, Forder 
(2001).  
(12) The timing of privatization’s indicator records the first decision to privatize in each sector.  
(13) The scores were calculated for each country on a scale of 1 (private) to 5 (public). Averages 
were then calculated for each of the three groups.  
(14) The EU degree of nominal independence in electricity is slightly higher but the difference is not 
significant.  
(15) This decision was made as early as 1878, only two years after Bell’s invention of the telephone. 
In the case of electricity, the British political system was even faster to exert control over 
concessions, and it established a parliamentary committee on this issue two years before electricity 
was introduced into London on commercial basis.  
(16) The first remarkable step was made in 1909 by the Swedish government, which created a 
company called Vattenfall that was the first state-owned utility in Europe and probably in the world. 
(17) Even the French authorities, for example, made serious efforts to keep most of their electricity 
system in private hands up to the end of the Second World War.  
(18) Spain never nationalized its entire electricity industry but made significant moves in that 
direction in 1985. Portugal nationalized its entire industry in 1976.  
(19) Another country, Belgium, did not nationalize electricity and therefore could not privatize it.  
(20) I am even more skeptical than Schneider of the role of Europeanization in the liberalization of 
telecoms, and would argue that Italy would have liberalized its telecoms industry even without the 
EU, albeit with even longer delays.  
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Strategies of Liberalization and Europeanization 
Table II 
Delegating Downward: Non-EU Countries  
x2 for column 1=22.5; x2 for column 2=13.46; Both significant at the level <0.001
 
(Source: see appendix) 
  
  
  
EU-Level Policy 
Choices / 
Components of 
Liberalization 
No 
EU-Regime 
 
[1] 
Informal 
Regime 
 
[2] 
Inter- 
governmental 
Regime 
[3] 
Supra- 
national 
Regime 
[4] 
Ownership 
Privatization in 
telecoms and 
electricity
     
Administrative 
Reform   
Separate and 
Independent 
Regulatory 
Authorities in 
telecoms and 
electricity 
   
Deregulation       Telecom 
Equipment 
Regulation-of- 
competition     
All aspects of two 
sectors but notably 
Electricity 
generation 
 
Regulation-for- 
competition    
Electricity 
transmission & 
distribution
Telecoms 
networks 
Countries that ...
...established 
Separate Regulatory Authorities
(I) 
...allow them 
Nominal Independence 
(II) 
Telecoms  
(no of countries) 
98 out of 145 
(68%) 
67 out 90 
(74%) 
Electricity 
(no of countries) 
45 out of 117 
( 38%) 
22 out of 40 
(55%) 
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National Level Patterns of Liberalization in Telecoms in 
Electricity 
(*) Ownership Key: Private=5; Mostly Private=4 Mixed=3 Mostly Public=2 Public=1 Ownership 
classifications for both sectors are based on my own estimate of the public share in the revenue of 
the industry for each country. The classification was carried according to the following criteria: 
Mostly Public (more than 85%), Mostly Public (70%-85%), Mixed (30%-70%), Mostly Private 
(15%-30%) and Private (less than 15%). The ownership calculations in telecoms refer to the 
European Union 
(N=14) 
[1] 
Latin America 
(N=16)  
[2] 
Democratic & Rich
(N=8) 
[3] 
Telecoms Electricity Telecoms Electricity Telecoms Electricity
O 
W 
N 
E 
R 
S 
H 
I 
P 
Number of 
Privatization Events 
100%  
(14 of 14) 
62% 
(8 from 
13) 
62% 
(10 from 
16) 
69% 
(11 from 
16) 
100% 
(7 from 7) 
57% 
(4 from 7) 
Median Year of 
Privatization Events  1996 1991 1994 1995 1990 1993
Mean Year (range & 
standard deviation)
1995, 
(19; 4.5) 
1992, 
(15; 5.3) 
1993, 
(16; 5) 
1995, 
(14; 4) 
1992, 
(14; 5.5) 
1994, 
(5; 2.2) 
Ownership* 1975 
(score and standard 
deviation) 
Public 
(1.3; 0.6) 
Mostly 
Public 
(2.1; 1.3) 
Public 
(1.1; 0.3) 
Mostly 
Public 
(1.4; 0.5) 
Mostly 
Public 
(1.9; 1.5) 
Mostly 
Public 
(2.2; 1.5) 
Ownership* 2000 
(score and standard 
deviation)
Mostly 
Private 
(3.7; 1) 
Mixed 
(2.8; 1.4) 
Mixed 
(3.2; 1.6) 
Mixed 
(2.9; 1.4) 
Mostly 
Private 
(4; 0.9) 
Mixed 
(2.6; 1.3) 
A 
D 
M 
I 
N 
I 
S 
T 
R 
A 
T 
I 
O 
N 
Established Regulatory 
agencies 
100% 
(14 from 
14) 
86% 
(12 from 
14) 
100% 
(16 from 
16) 
81% 
(13 from 
16) 
62% 
(5 from 8) 
62% 
(5 from 8) 
Median Year  1996 1997 1995 1994 1987  1987
Mean Year (range, 
S.D.)
1994 
(12, 4.3) 
1997 
(11, 3.3) 
1994 
(15, 3.8) 
1994 
(12, 3.3) 
1976 
(58, 24) 
1974 
(61, 26) 
Nominal Independence 
of Regulatory 
Agencies
100% 
(14 from 
14) 
93% 
(11 from 
12) 
62% 
(10 from 
16) 
54% 
(7 from 
13) 
100% 
(5 from 5) 
80% 
(4 from 5) 
C 
O 
M 
P 
E 
T 
I 
T 
I 
O 
N
Wholesale 
Competition** 
100% 
(14 from 
14) 
100% 
(14 from 
14) 
44% 
(7 from 
16) 
50% 
(8 from 
16) 
100% 
(8 from 8) 
62% 
(5 from 8) 
Retail Competition*** 
100% 
(14 from 
14) 
29% 
(4 from 
14) 
6% 
(1 from 
16) 
6% 
(1 from 
16) 
75% 
(6 from 8) 
50% 
(4 from 8) 
Seite 2 von 4 EIoP: Text 2002-007: Tables
22.04.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-007t.htmtraditional business of telephony and not to the Internet or mobile markets.  
(**) Opening the International Telecoms Market for Competition and Transmission Networks in 
electricity.  
(***) Telecoms unbundling or free choice of supplier in electricity  
Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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